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<h3>How we have identified, investigated and addressed <br> the biosafety issue in the context of the ExpandED project. </h3> | <h3>How we have identified, investigated and addressed <br> the biosafety issue in the context of the ExpandED project. </h3> | ||
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<h3>INTRODUCTION</h3> | <h3>INTRODUCTION</h3> | ||
<p>Since the Edinburgh OG iGEM 2016 team has directly worked with non-model organisms and, ultimately, the goal of our project is to encourage future iGEM teams to use these microorganisms as well as domesticate additional, novel microorganisms, we have an obligation to review and inform the current situation regarding the use of non-model organisms, its regulatory framework and its biosafety and biosecurity status. | <p>Since the Edinburgh OG iGEM 2016 team has directly worked with non-model organisms and, ultimately, the goal of our project is to encourage future iGEM teams to use these microorganisms as well as domesticate additional, novel microorganisms, we have an obligation to review and inform the current situation regarding the use of non-model organisms, its regulatory framework and its biosafety and biosecurity status. | ||
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As previously mentioned, the intended expansion of strains to be used within the context of synthetic biology (SynBio) through the domestication of uncommon microorganisms comes with biosafety and biosecurity issues that need to be addressed properly. For example, when analysing our microorganisms, we found out that filamentous fungi are able to produce a wide array of important secondary metabolites (e.g. naphto-γ-pyrones and ß-lactam antibiotics, such as penicillin) with diverse biological activities relevant for the food, pharmaceutical and cosmetic industries: antimicrobial, antioxidant, anti-cancer, anti-tubercular, anti-HIV and anti-hyperuricuric (Choque et al. 2014). Nonetheless, they may also produce mycotoxins that can cause unwanted health and environmental problems, such as human disease (myxotoxicoses) (Peraica et al. 1999) and food and silage spoilage (Filtenborg et al. 1996). | As previously mentioned, the intended expansion of strains to be used within the context of synthetic biology (SynBio) through the domestication of uncommon microorganisms comes with biosafety and biosecurity issues that need to be addressed properly. For example, when analysing our microorganisms, we found out that filamentous fungi are able to produce a wide array of important secondary metabolites (e.g. naphto-γ-pyrones and ß-lactam antibiotics, such as penicillin) with diverse biological activities relevant for the food, pharmaceutical and cosmetic industries: antimicrobial, antioxidant, anti-cancer, anti-tubercular, anti-HIV and anti-hyperuricuric (Choque et al. 2014). Nonetheless, they may also produce mycotoxins that can cause unwanted health and environmental problems, such as human disease (myxotoxicoses) (Peraica et al. 1999) and food and silage spoilage (Filtenborg et al. 1996). | ||
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<h3>ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS</h3> | <h3>ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS</h3> | ||
<p>The commercial applications of SynBio might entail the release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the environment. For instance, the NTU-Taida 2012 iGEM project involved the direct interaction of genetically modified bacteria with humans as they engineered Escherichia coli as a vector to deliver peptide drugs to the human gut (NTU-Taida iGEM 2012). Other examples of iGEM projects that are associated with the release of GMOs to the environment are the Imperial College London 2011 team, which used genetically modified E. coli to secrete the auxin indoleacetic acid (IAA) to prevent erosion (Imperial College London iGEM 2011), and the Lethbridge 2011 team, which developed a toolkit based on genetically modified E. coli to be used for the clean-up of polluted lakes (University of Lethbridge iGEM 2011). | <p>The commercial applications of SynBio might entail the release of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the environment. For instance, the NTU-Taida 2012 iGEM project involved the direct interaction of genetically modified bacteria with humans as they engineered Escherichia coli as a vector to deliver peptide drugs to the human gut (NTU-Taida iGEM 2012). Other examples of iGEM projects that are associated with the release of GMOs to the environment are the Imperial College London 2011 team, which used genetically modified E. coli to secrete the auxin indoleacetic acid (IAA) to prevent erosion (Imperial College London iGEM 2011), and the Lethbridge 2011 team, which developed a toolkit based on genetically modified E. coli to be used for the clean-up of polluted lakes (University of Lethbridge iGEM 2011). | ||
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One also has to consider that, once released, GMOs cannot be retrieved and this poses a major risk to the environment. For instance, the differences in the physiology of synthetic and natural microorganisms might alter the manner those interact with their surroundings. Furthermore, the GMOs may survive, evolve and adapt quickly, hence competing successfully with wild-type strains. Another important risk is their gene transfer ability, based on which GMOs could take up genetic material from the environment or exchange it with other microorganisms (Dana et al. 2012). | One also has to consider that, once released, GMOs cannot be retrieved and this poses a major risk to the environment. For instance, the differences in the physiology of synthetic and natural microorganisms might alter the manner those interact with their surroundings. Furthermore, the GMOs may survive, evolve and adapt quickly, hence competing successfully with wild-type strains. Another important risk is their gene transfer ability, based on which GMOs could take up genetic material from the environment or exchange it with other microorganisms (Dana et al. 2012). | ||
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<h3>CURRENT REGULATIONS AND RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE</h3> | <h3>CURRENT REGULATIONS AND RISK ASSESSMENT PRACTICE</h3> | ||
<p>Since the events in the US of 9/11 and the anthrax attacks on that same year, security concerns have increased due to the increasing threat of biological or chemical terrorist attacks. These concerns have been compounded by recent developments in the SynBio toolkit through which it is now possible, for example, to synthesise entire microorganisms (Hamilton 2015). As a consequence, these incidents have extended the concerns about biosecurity among the entire research community. Therefore, new efforts have been made towards designing new ways to hinder malicious uses of these developed technologies (Garfinkel et al. 2007). | <p>Since the events in the US of 9/11 and the anthrax attacks on that same year, security concerns have increased due to the increasing threat of biological or chemical terrorist attacks. These concerns have been compounded by recent developments in the SynBio toolkit through which it is now possible, for example, to synthesise entire microorganisms (Hamilton 2015). As a consequence, these incidents have extended the concerns about biosecurity among the entire research community. Therefore, new efforts have been made towards designing new ways to hinder malicious uses of these developed technologies (Garfinkel et al. 2007). | ||
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However, the existing biosafety and biosecurity framework pertaining to molecular biology was created before the fast-paced developments in SynBio, such as DNA synthesis, sequencing and high-throughput assembly, took place. Moreover, risk assessment methods are usually limited to paperwork that is completed and signed off by senior members while other laboratory members do not contribute in a relevant manner to those assessments (Marles-Wright 2016). | However, the existing biosafety and biosecurity framework pertaining to molecular biology was created before the fast-paced developments in SynBio, such as DNA synthesis, sequencing and high-throughput assembly, took place. Moreover, risk assessment methods are usually limited to paperwork that is completed and signed off by senior members while other laboratory members do not contribute in a relevant manner to those assessments (Marles-Wright 2016). | ||
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<h3>PREVIOUS RISK ASSESSMENT PROPOSALS</h3> | <h3>PREVIOUS RISK ASSESSMENT PROPOSALS</h3> | ||
<p>Accordingly, numerous improvements to risk assessment methodologies can be made to ensure that biosafety and biosecurity are guaranteed while the benefits of SynBio developments are not compromised, such as having better communication and cooperation between the SynBio community and society in general (Schmidt 2009) in order to ensure that the biosafety and biosecurity components are integrated in molecular and synthetic biology research. On this matter, it has been proposed that, by fostering both social intelligence and public knowledge about science, the contribution of science to benefit society is assured (van Doren & Heyen 2014). | <p>Accordingly, numerous improvements to risk assessment methodologies can be made to ensure that biosafety and biosecurity are guaranteed while the benefits of SynBio developments are not compromised, such as having better communication and cooperation between the SynBio community and society in general (Schmidt 2009) in order to ensure that the biosafety and biosecurity components are integrated in molecular and synthetic biology research. On this matter, it has been proposed that, by fostering both social intelligence and public knowledge about science, the contribution of science to benefit society is assured (van Doren & Heyen 2014). |
Revision as of 23:04, 19 October 2016
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